Ohio v. Cowan Desicion... 

US Supreme Court:Below is the US Supreme Court case that renders BSL unconstitutional.
The very last sentence makes it very clear that as long as an action
involving dog law does not take our due process away it is
constitutional. We suggest everyone fighting BSL use this case.



U.S. Supreme Court
NICCHIA v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK , 254 U.S. 228 (1920)
254 U.S. 228

NICCHIA
v.
PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK.
No. 74.

Argued Nov. 17, 1920.
Decided Dec. 6, 1920.



Messrs. Joseph Nicchia and George P. Foulk, both of New York City, for
plaintiff in error.

Mr. Harry G. Anderson, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for the People of State of
New York.


Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error owned two dogs which she harbored within New York
City without having obtained the license required by chapter 115, Laws
of New York of 1894, as amended by chapter 412, Laws 1895, and chapter
495, Laws 1902. She was charged with violating the statute on November
11, 1916, [254 U.S. 228, 229] found guilty in the City Magistrates'
Court, Brooklyn, and required to pay a fine. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment without opinion.

Chapter 115 as amended provides:

'Section 1. Every person who owns or harbors one or more dogs within
the corporate limits of any city having a population of over eight
hundred thousand shall procure a yearly license and pay the sum of two
dollars for each dog. ...
'Sec. 8. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
is hereby empowered and authorized to carry out the provisions of this
act, and

the said society is further authorized to issue the licenses and
renewals, and to collect the fees therefor, as herein prescribed; and
the fees so collected shall be applied by said society in defraying the
cost of carrying

out the provisions of this act and maintaining a shelter for lost,
strayed or homeless animals; and any fees so collected and not required
in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be retained by the
said society as compensation for enforcing the provisions of title
sixteen of the penal code

and such other statutes of the state as relate to the humane work in
which the said society is engaged.
'Sec. 9. Any person or persons, who shall hinder or molest or interfere
with

any officer or agent of said society in the performance of any duty
enjoined

by this act, or who shall use a license tag on a dog for which it was
not issued, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who
owns or harbors a dog, without complying with the provisions of this
act shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction
thereof before any magistrate shall be fined for such offense any sum
not exceeding ten dollars, and in default of payment of such fine may
be committed to prison by such magistrate until the same be paid, but
such imprisonment shall not exceed ten days.' [254 U.S. 228, 230] The
validity of the act was questioned upon the ground that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, by 'depriving a citizen of his liberty
without due process of law, to wit, the liberty of owning and harboring
a dog without procuring a license from and paying a fee therefor to the
Society, a private corporation.' In Fox v. Mohawk & H. R. Humane
Society (1901) 165 N. Y. 517,
59 N. E. 353, 51 L. R. A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767, the Court of
Appeals declared a statute essentially the same as chapter 115 before
the amendment of 1902 invalid under the state Constitution because it
appropriated public funds for the use of a private corporation and also
because it conferred an exclusive privilege. But the court repudiated
the suggestion that the statute deprived dog owners of property without
due process or delegated governmental power to a private corporation.
Thereafter (1902) the Legislature amended chapter 115 with the evident
purpose of meeting objections pointed out in the Fox Case. Thus amended
the law has been upheld. Our only concern is with the suggested federal question.
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was
incorporated by chapter 469, Laws of New York 1866. 'The purpose of the
corporation was to enforce the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals.'
Divis v. American Society, 75 N. Y. 362, 366. It has long been
recognized by

the Legislature as a valuable and efficient aid toward the enforcement
of those laws. New York Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 40) art. 16, 196.
The payment of public funds to a similar corporation for assistance in
enforcing

penal statutes has been declared unobjectionable. People ex rel. State
Board

of Charities v. New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children,
161 N. Y. 233, 239, 250, 55 N. E. 1063

Property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be
subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state
without depriving their owners of any federal right. Sentell v. N. O. &
C. [254 U.S.

228, 231] R. R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 , 17 Sup. Ct. 693; Fox v. Mohawk & H. R.

Humane Society, supra. Its power to require those who wish to keep dogs
to secure licenses from and pay fees to a public officer is also clear.
And when the state in the reasonable conduct of its own affairs chooses
to entrust the work incident to such licenses and collection of fees to
a corporation created by it for the express purpose of aiding in law
enforcement, and in good faith appropriates the funds so collected for
payment of expenses fairly incurred and just compensation for the
valuable services rendered, there is no infringement of any right
guaranteed to the individual by the federal Constitution. Such action
does not amount to the taking of one man's property and giving it to
another, nor does it deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law.

The judgment below must be

Affirmed.